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INTRODUCTION 
When a dangerously mentally ill person is in need of in-patient 
psychiatric hospitalization, the apparatus for involuntary civil 
commitment goes into motion.  As a result, a mentally ill person can 
be confined against his or her will, to remain in the hospital 
indefinitely.  The mentally ill person’s freedom depends on the 
outcome of a single hearing.  The civil commitment process raises a 
number of legal questions: What are the constitutional protections 
against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent? Who 
presides over the hearing?  Do the rules of evidence apply, 
specifically hearsay?  Is the burden of proof standard by the 
preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing, or beyond a 
reasonable doubt? Should the mentally ill person have the right to an 
independent evaluation of his or her psychiatric condition to contest 
the view of the hospital psychiatrist?  Is the adversarial hearing 
process best suited to address the need for in-patient hospitalization? 
Should legal guardians and those designated as power of attorney be 
given the authority to voluntarily admit a patient into a psychiatric 
hospital? 
This Article will explore the current involuntary civil commitment 
process for confining a mentally ill and dangerous person in a 
psychiatric hospital.  A criminal defendant is often guaranteed greater 
protections than a mentally ill person facing involuntary civil 
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commitment.  As a person’s freedom is at stake, the serious nature of 
confinement warrants a critical review of how we address the need for 
psychiatric treatment of our dangerously mentally ill. 
Part I will examine the government’s power to confine a mentally 
ill person and the minimum due process safeguards for involuntary 
admission. Part II will explore the applicability of the constitutional 
right to remain silent in civil commitment proceedings. Part III will 
discuss the authority of mental health professionals to testify at the 
civil commitment hearings and consider issues of privileged 
communication.  Parts IV and V will look at issues pertaining to the 
rules of evidence, ranging from the burden of proof to hearsay 
evidence as heard by the hearing judge. Parts VI and VII will analyze 
respectively the right to an independent psychiatric evaluation and 
alternative procedures to resolve the determination of the need for 
hospitalization. Part VIII will address the rights of others to consent 
to voluntary hospitalization of a mentally ill person, including 
guardians, persons with power of attorney, and parents of minor 
persons. Part IX will make recommendations for improving the 
involuntary civil confinement process. 
This Article provides an analysis of the current system and 
practical, concrete suggestions for improving the involuntary civil 
confinement process through the eyes of the attorney representing 
the mentally ill client facing involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. 
I.  THE GOVERNMENT’S POWER TO CONFINE, MINIMAL DUE 
PROCESS PROTECTIONS, AND THE REMAINING VOID OF DUE 
PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
This section outlines a historical perspective of the civil 
commitment process, including the source of the government’s power 
to confine mentally ill persons, the minimum due process safeguards 
for the procedure, and the voids that still exist in those safeguards. 
A. The Government’s Power to Apprehend and Confine a Person 
with a Mental Illness 
Half a century ago, it was recognized that the current treatment of 
persons with mental illness was inhumane and that change was 
imperative.  State and federal courts, acknowledging that civil 
commitment was a significant curtailment of liberty interests,1 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 
(1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); 
Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
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established procedural limitations to the previously unchallenged 
practice of committing mentally ill persons for treatment purposes 
under parens patriae powers.2  Following landmark Supreme Court 
decisions,3 most states adopted a stricter criterion for civil 
commitment requiring, at a minimum, a showing of 
“dangerousness.”4 
According to the United States Supreme Court, the State has a 
legitimate interest under its parens patriae power in providing care to 
the mentally ill who are unable to care for themselves.5  In addition, 
the Court recognizes the state has the authority under its police 
power to protect the community from the dangerously mentally ill.6 
The interplay of these two opposing governmental roles presents 
conflict when the rights of the involuntarily confined are at stake. 
Unfortunately, several decades later attitudes have changed and 
the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, lowering the 
threshold.7  State legislatures, with the broad support of the medical 
community,8 have moved to expand the definition of 
“dangerousness” back to the dark ages prior to the 1960s. Only eight 
states still define dangerousness solely as a “danger to self or others.”9 
Forty-two states provide criteria broader than dangerousness that 
often include either a “grave disability”10 or a “need for treatment”11 
provision. 
                                                                                                                 
 2. R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform on 
Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Central Analysis, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 4545–46 
(1988). 
 3. Addington, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
 4. Robert A Brooks, Psychiatrists’ Opinions About Involuntary Civil 
Commitment: Results of a National Survey, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 219 
(2007). 
 5. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Donald H. Stone, Confine is Fine: Have The Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill 
Lost Their Right to Liberty? An Empirical Study to Unravel the Psychiatrist’s 
Crystal Ball, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L., 323, 325 (2012). 
 8. Brooks, supra note 4.  
 9. Improved Treatment Standards, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/solutions/improved-treatment-standards. 
 10. Id. (stating that grave disability is an additional criterion that allows for 
commitment where a mentally ill person is unable to care for their basic needs). 
 11. Id. (stating that need for treatment provisions are based on either the person’s 
inability to provide for needed psychiatric care, inability to make an informed 
medical decision, or need for intervention to prevent further psychiatric or emotional 
deterioration). 
2016]CRACKS IN THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS793 
The regressive trend in civil commitment laws requires scrutiny.  In 
most cases, criminal defendants, whom the government has authority 
to confine via the police power, are afforded greater protections than 
mentally ill persons facing involuntary civil commitment. 
B. Minimal Due Process Protections Afforded by the Supreme 
Court 
The United States Supreme Court articulated in O’Connor v. 
Donaldson that the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is 
treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if the patient is 
not a danger to himself or others.12  The Court declared that a state 
cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous individual who is 
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of 
willing and responsible family members or friends.13 The Court 
specifically held: 
A finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a 
person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple 
custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given a 
reasonably precise content and that the ‘mentally ill’ can be 
identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional 
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous 
to no one and can live safely in freedom.14 
Thus, the confinement of a non-dangerous person based upon mental 
illness alone is not constitutionally sufficient.15 
In the landmark case Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court 
recognized that civil commitment “constitutes a significant 
deprivation of liberty”16 and that mentally ill individuals facing 
involuntary civil commitment can lead to adverse social 
consequences.17   The Court noted the very significant impact an 
involuntary commitment to a mental hospital would have on the 
individual by stating: 
                                                                                                                 
 12. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 570 (1975).  The Court requires that 
minimally adequate treatment should be provided. 
 13. Id. at 576. 
 14. Id. at 575. 
 15. Id.  The O’Connor Court further noted the “important” nature of its holding 
as one “concerning every man’s constitutional right to liberty.” Id. at 573. 
 16. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 
(1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)). 
 17. Id. at 425–26. 
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[I]t is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental 
hospital . . .  can engender adverse social consequences to the 
individual. Whether we label this phenomena “stigma” or choose to 
call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it 
can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the 
individual.18 
The Court appreciated the individual’s interest in the outcome of a 
civil commitment proceeding is of the weight and gravity that due 
process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more 
substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence.19 The Court 
held that the proper burden of proof at the civil commitment hearing 
was a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof,20 although as 
will be discussed later, several states laws have applied the more 
stringent beyond a reasonable doubt standard.21 
Another significant cornerstone of due process protections for 
persons facing civil commitment is limiting the length of the stay in 
the hospital. In Jackson v. Indiana,22 the Court announced its 
prohibition on indefinite confinement, holding that it violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.23  In so holding, 
the Court imposed a rule of reasonableness, requiring that without a 
finding of dangerousness, one committed through the civil 
commitment process could only be held for a reasonable period of 
time.24 
C. The Void of Due Process Safeguards in the Civil Commitment 
Process: Lessard v. Schmidt 
Lessard v. Schmidt, a landmark mental health decision by a lower 
federal court, highlighted several due process implications in the 
context of civil commitments.25  The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Wisconsin acknowledged that in civil 
commitment proceedings, the same fundamental liberties are at stake 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1810. 
 20. Id. at 1812. 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) 
 23. Id. at 731. 
 24. Id. at 1855. 
 25. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 
(1974).  The Court addressed other issues including timely notice of petition, notice 
of right to jury trial, length of detention prior to a hearing, right to counsel, hearsay 
evidence, as well as the privilege against self-incrimination. 
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as in criminal cases.26  The failure to provide due process safeguards 
against unjustified deprivation of liberty in the context of involuntary 
civil commitments was of grave concern to the court.27  The 
abhorrence to the relaxation of criminal due process standards in the 
involuntary civil commitment arena is especially important. The court 
was skeptical of lengthy hospitalization that may greatly increase 
symptoms of mental illness and make adjustment to society more 
difficult.28  It also recognized the enormous and devastating effect on 
the individual’s civil rights, as well as the stigma that accompanies any 
hospitalization.29  Furthermore, the court had great concerns for the 
secondary impacts of civil commitment on the committed individual, 
ranging from the loss of basic civil rights to the loss of future 
opportunities.30 
The Lessard court also recognized other significant due process 
rights, ranging from notice of the commencement of proceedings to 
the opportunity to be heard at the hearing.31  Although the Lessard 
decision did not articulate the precise nature of the hearing, it did 
explain that a mentally ill person is entitled to a preliminary hearing 
within forty-eight hours of first being detained32 and a full hearing 
within ten to fourteen days after their initial detainment.33 
Involuntary civil commitment hearings require a determination 
that a mentally ill person is a danger to his or her self or others.34 The 
Lessard court recognized the difficulty in predicting future conduct 
and viewed confinement based on such predictions with suspicion.35 
In recognition of this challenge, the Court determined that the state 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to show the 
individual is mentally ill and dangerous.36 Civil commitment laws vary 
among the states with respect to the burden of proof standard, which 
ranges from clear and convincing evidence to the beyond a 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 1084. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1087. 
 29. Id. at 1089.  The Court noted the job market is better for ex-felons than ex-
patients. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1090. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1091. 
 33. Id. at 1092. 
 34. See, e.g., N.Y. Ment. Hyg. Law § 9.37(a). 
 35. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. . at 1093. 
 36. Id. at 1095. 
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reasonable doubt standard.37 In addition, the court announced the 
right to counsel for persons facing involuntary civil commitment.38 
Lessard’s declaration of due process protections recognizes the 
serious implications faced by a person subjected to involuntary civil 
commitment. As a result, the civil commitment process became 
remarkably similar to a criminal proceeding through considering the 
potential loss of liberty as well as the negative impact on one’s 
reputation (i.e., “stigma”).  The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination39 afforded in criminal cases40 was also considered in 
Lessard in terms of its application to civil commitment proceedings.41 
Lessard acknowledged that the availability of the privilege does not 
turn upon the type of proceeding but rather upon the nature of the 
patient’s statement or admission to hospital or police personnel and 
the exposure that it invites.42 The privilege may be claimed in civil or 
administrative proceedings if the content of the statement may be 
inculpatory.43  The threat of deprivation of liberty, clearly evident in 
civil commitment proceedings, was recognized by the court.44 
Lessard’s conclusion was to extend the privilege against self-
incrimination whenever a person is committed on the basis of his or 
her statements to a psychiatrist in the absence of a showing that the 
statements were made with “knowledge” that the individual was not 
obligated to speak.45 
There are other instances where the privilege against self-
incrimination may come into play, from the initial detention, which 
often involves the police, to the continued confinement or 
observation stages46 in which the mentally ill individual will have 
frequent conversations with a psychiatrist who may testify at the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126 (beyond a reasonable doubt); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 16, § 5011 (clear and convincing evidence); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
§ 574.034 (clear and convincing evidence); In re Turner, 439 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 1982) 
(clear and convincing evidence); Massachusetts v. Nassar, 406 N.E.2d 1286 (1980) 
(beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 38. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1097. 
 39. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. 
 40. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 41. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1100. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1101. Such is deprivation of liberty if the person is held against his will. 
 45. Id. at 1101. The psychiatrists should inform the patient that he is going to be 
examined with regard to his mental condition and such statements he makes may be 
the basis for commitment and that he does not have to speak to the psychiatrist. 
 46. See, e.g., CODE OF MD. REGULATIONS [hereinafter COMAR] § 10.21.01.07.  
Initial confinement is an observation status. 
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pending civil commitment hearing. At the hearing itself, there may be 
opportunities for the mentally ill person to make statements.47  At all 
of these vital stages, the right to the privilege against self-
incrimination comes into play. The statements made by an individual 
at various stages in the civil commitment process—to police at the 
earliest stages, to psychiatrists and other hospital personnel upon 
confinement prior to the civil commitment hearing, and, finally, at the 
hearing itself—all cast into doubt the actual protection against self-
incrimination. 
The Lessard court also considered a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the civil commitment statute based on the use of 
hearsay evidence at the commitment hearing.48 The court appreciated 
the standard exclusionary rules forbidding the admission of evidence 
in criminal cases and saw no sound policy reasons for admitting 
evidence in involuntary civil commitment hearings.49 This strict 
adherence to the rules of evidence is applicable to proceedings in 
which an individual’s liberty is in jeopardy.50 The Lessard holding 
with respect to self-incrimination, as well as hearsay, will be explained 
further in analyzing current state civil commitment laws. 
The Lessard decision was ultimately overturned on other grounds 
and never amounted to binding precedent.  However, the court’s 
recognition of serious problems regarding the involuntary civil 
commitment process in the United States is of extreme importance. 
Forty-three years after the Lessard opinion, most of the same serious 
problems exist. 
The Supreme Court, in Vitek v. Jones, recognized the significant 
loss of liberty involved in an involuntary civil commitment.51 Other 
courts have attempted to elevate the rights of the involuntarily 
committed to that of a criminal defendant. For example, in Terrace v. 
Northville, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit announced that 
involuntarily committed psychiatric patients have greater rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment than criminals under the Eighth 
Amendment and, therefore, a person involuntarily committed should 
be entitled to more considerate treatment in conditions of 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.19 (2014). 
 48. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1102. 
 49. Id. at 1103. 
 50. Id.  The Lessard Court quotes Justice Brandeis saying, “[e]xperience should 
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes 
are beneficial . . . the greatest danger to liberty is insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 479 (1928). 
 51. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980). 
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confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
intended as punishment.52 
Several courts have discussed the rights of the involuntarily 
committed person, equating those rights to that of the criminal 
defendant.53 However, the extent to which the privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable is far from clear. Courts should continue to 
consider the similarities between these two groups and extend the due 
process protection even further for the mentally ill person facing 
involuntary hospitalization. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT: DOES IT 
APPLY TO CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS? 
When a mentally ill person is exhibiting dangerous behavior in the 
community, police are authorized to detain and transport the 
individual to a hospital for an examination.54  At the hospital, 
physicians will conduct an examination to determine if the person 
poses a danger to him or her self or others as a result of a mental 
illness and, if so, would require in-patient psychiatric 
hospitalization.55 Once hospitalized in the psychiatric facility, the 
mentally ill person will begin receiving mental health treatment for 
several days prior to a civil commitment hearing.56  During the period 
of time after first being detained, transported, and examined and the 
treatment commencing, as many as ten or eleven days may pass.57 
This is all time during which the mentally ill individual has the 
potential to make statements to the police, family members, and/or 
mental health professionals who may repeat such statements at the 
civil commitment hearing. These statements may then be used as a 
basis for confinement. 
What are the rights of the mentally ill person to prevent such self-
incriminating statements from being used against him or her to prove 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Terrance v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 28, 34 (6th Cir. 
2002). This is based on the notion that criminals are confined for punishment under 
the state’s police power, whereas the involuntarily committed are confined for 
treatment under the state’s parens patriae role. 
 53. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 
605 (1967); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
 54. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN., § 10-622(d), § 10-624. 
 55. See, e.g., id. § 10-616. 
 56. See, e.g., id. § 10-625. 
 57. See, e.g., id. § 10-632(b). The hearing shall be conducted within ten days of 
initial confinement; in addition, an evaluee may have been detained in an emergency 
evaluation for up to thirty hours. See id. § 10-624(b)(4). 
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the presence of dangerous behavior? Should the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, applicable to criminal 
proceedings,58 be extended to involuntary civil commitment hearings?  
The deprivation of liberty that is present in the criminal context 
surely extends to person involuntarily confined against their will in a 
psychiatric hospital. 
A. Miranda and the Civil Commitment Process 
In the context of a custodial police interrogation, Miranda v. 
Arizona and its progeny provide that any statement made in such a 
context is prohibited from being used against the speaker unless 
police provided Miranda warnings.59 In Miranda, the Supreme Court 
evaluated the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant 
while in police custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in a significant way.60  When a mentally ill person is acting in a 
dangerous way that leads police to believe he or she is in need of 
psychiatric hospitalization, the person is then taken into police 
custody, transported against his or her will for a psychiatric 
evaluation, and is not free to leave.61  During this period of detention, 
a mentally ill person may make statements that form the basis of 
future police testimony that the person poses a danger to one’s self or 
others. Such statements may be incriminating by including admission 
of criminal wrongdoing. 
The Miranda Court spoke of the police practice of incommunicado 
interrogation, which is at odds with one of the United States’ most 
cherished principles: that the individual may not be compelled to 
incriminate himself.62  Similarly, in the civil commitment setting, the 
mentally ill individual is often subject to intimidation and 
confinement, which, as in Miranda, is used to subjugate the individual 
to the will of his examiner.63  In this context, the examination would 
                                                                                                                 
 58. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. When an individual is taken into custody or 
deprived of his freedom, Miranda mandates that the individual be warned that he has 
the right to remain silent and anything said can be used against him in court, and that 
he has the right to be questioned in the presence of an attorney and if he cannot 
afford an attorney, one will be appointed to him prior to any questioning.  Id. 
 60. Id. at 445. The Court gave particular note to the fact that the defendant, while 
in custody, was cut off from the outside world.  The nature of this incommunicado 
environment was the Court’s basis for its ultimate finding that custody situations are 
inherently coercive. 
 61. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN., § 10-624. 
 62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
 63. See id. 
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include police, emergency room personnel, and hospital mental 
health workers. Individuals confined to inpatient psychiatric hospitals 
face greater deprivation of freedom than those who are incarcerated, 
as arrestees have diminished liberties but persons civilly committed 
are outside of the penal authority. 
The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends 
outside of criminal court proceedings and recognized that it protects 
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in 
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.64 
As Miranda declares, when an individual is taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant 
way and is then subjected to questioning, the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination is jeopardized.65 The mentally ill person 
detained by police and confined in a psychiatric facility too should be 
extended the Miranda protections, including being warned prior to 
questioning that he has a right to remain silent and anything he says 
can be used against him in an involuntary civil commitment hearing.  
The Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he loss of liberty produced 
by involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom from 
confinement.”66 
The privilege against self-incrimination was expanded in In re 
Gault, where the Supreme Court examined the due process rights of 
juveniles charged with delinquency.67  The Court recognized that 
although the juvenile proceedings were not criminal, the results were 
the same and determinations of delinquency could lead to 
commitment in a state institution, which is a deprivation of liberty.68 
Incarceration against one’s will has occurred, and whether called 
criminal or civil, deprivation of liberty has occurred.69 So, in the civil 
commitment context, the deprivation of one’s freedom has occurred, 
calling for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
to apply.  Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in McNeil v. 
Patuxent Institution Director, asserted that the Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to commitment 
proceedings even though they are normally labeled civil 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 466. 
 65. Id. at 478. 
 66. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980). 
 67. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 68. Id. at 49; see also French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C 1977). 
 69. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 50; see also In re Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1985). 
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proceedings.70 When the state asserts that a mentally ill person poses 
a danger to self or others, the state should be required to prove the 
need for psychiatric confinement through ways other than the 
mentally ill person’s compelled statements. Observations by other 
witnesses should form the basis of the state’s case for confinement. 
B. State Laws on the Right to Remain Silent in the Civil 
Commitment Setting 
Several state legislatures have extended the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination beyond the criminal context and into the 
civil commitment process.71 For example, in a Pennsylvania hearing 
on a petition for court-ordered involuntary treatment, a patient shall 
not be called as a witness without his consent.72 Alabama civil 
commitment laws also prohibit a patient from being compelled to 
testify against his or her self.73  Other states providing for the right to 
remain silent in the civil commitment hearing include Alaska, 
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Ohio, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.74 These states that provide for the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to remain silent recognize the significant 
infringement on one’s liberty interest caused by involuntary civil 
commitment. 
In contrast, several courts addressing the privilege against self-
incrimination and its applicability in the civil commitment context 
                                                                                                                 
 70. McNeil v. Patuxent Institution Director, 407 U.S. 254 (1972); see also Tyars v. 
Finner, 518 F. Supp. 502 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 
(D. Haw. 1976); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
 71. See ALA. CODE § 22-52-9; ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-
47-211; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16, § 5006; FLA. STAT. ANN. §394.467; HAW. REV. STAT. § 
334-60.5; MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73; MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335; MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 53-21-115; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.33; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15; 50 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.19; WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 71.05.360; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20; WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-10-109. 
 72. 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304. 
 73. ALA. CODE § 22-52-9. 
 74. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-211; DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit.16, § 5006; FLA. STAT. ANN. §394.467; HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.5; MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 41-21-73; MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335; MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115; 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.33; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 27A-12-3.19; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4; 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-109.  For state statutes addressing 
the privilege against self-incrimination, see Appendix A. 
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have held that the privilege does not apply.75  Occasionally, the state 
seeking confinement of a person to a psychiatric hospital will attempt 
to call the person subject to the involuntary commitment as an 
adverse witness to prove the need for involuntary hospitalization. The 
California Court of Appeals held that it was permissible for the 
hearing court to compel a person facing civil commitment to testify at 
the commitment hearing, on the basis that the privilege was not 
extended from the criminal context to the civil commitment context.76 
In Illinois, however, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the 
involuntary commitment proceedings do not encompass the right 
against self-incrimination, permitting one who is subject to such 
matters to be called as an adverse witness.77 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana rejected the civil commitment patient’s right to 
remain silent, holding that the privilege against self-incrimination has 
no applicability in civil commitment proceedings.78 Kiritsis 
acknowledged the resulting deprivation of liberty but recognized that 
the legitimate objectives of the statute and interests of the state would 
be wholly frustrated were individuals permitted to claim the privilege 
in civil commitment proceedings.79  Some courts even attempt to 
explain the authority to call the mentally ill person to testify and be 
questioned by the judge as analogous to the admissibility of physical 
evidence as opposed to testimonial evidence at a criminal trial.80 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon in Oregon v. Matthews, although 
not finding that due process requires a mentally ill person in a civil 
commitment proceeding be afforded the right to remain silent if his 
testimony may be used as a basis for confinement, held that one may 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Conservatorship of Bones, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1010 (1987); People v. Taylor, 618 
P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980); Matter of Nolan, 384 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); State ex 
rel. Kiritsis v. Marion Prob. Ct., 381 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. 1978); Matter of Baker, 324 
N.W.2d 91(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); In re Field, 412 A.2d 1032 (N.H. 1980); French v. 
Blackbum, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Matter of D.J.L., 964 P.2d 983 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 1998); Matter of Mathews, 613 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); In re 
Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); State v. McCarty, 892 A.2d 250 
(Vt. 2006). 
 76. Conservatorship of Bones, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1010 (1987). The state and federal 
constitutions, according to the Court, do not grant the patient a right not to testify. 
See also People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980). 
 77. Matter of Nolan, 384 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
 78. State ex rel. Kiritsis v. Marion Prob. Ct., 381 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. 1978); see also 
French v. Blackbum, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (rejecting a claim of the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment in involuntary civil commitment proceedings). 
 79. State ex rel. Kiritsis, 381 N.E.2d at 1247–48. 
 80. See Matter of Baker, 324 N.W.2d 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Matter of 
Matthews, 613 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that due process does not require 
the patient be afforded the right to remain silent). 
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assert his Fifth Amendment privilege whenever his testimony might 
implicate him in a criminal matter.81 Matthews cited Justice Douglas’ 
concurrence to the Supreme Court case McNeil v. Patuxent 
Institution Director,82 in which Justice Douglas concluded that the 
privilege did apply to any statements that might serve as a basis for 
commitment because there is harm and self-incrimination whenever 
there is a deprivation of liberty and there is such deprivation if the 
person is held against his will. A commitment is improper where it is 
based on statements made to a psychiatrist that lack evidence that 
such statements were made voluntarily after the individual was given 
notice that his statements might contribute to his commitment and 
that he is not obligated to speak.83 
The Matthews Court rationale for not extending the privilege was 
its conclusion that the best way to ascertain an individual’s condition 
at the civil commitment hearing is to question him and observe his 
demeanor, making it extremely difficult to commit persons in need of 
help if they refuse to talk.84 However, courts would not make such an 
assertion in a criminal prosecution, making the claim that the 
defendant’s own statements are necessary to incarcerate him. 
Evidence and testimony forming the basis of civil commitment should 
rely on observations of others and the acts of the mentally ill — not 
from that person’s statements. 
There are instances in which the judge presiding over the 
commitment hearing directly questions the mentally ill person to 
decide whether to confine the person to an inpatient psychiatric 
hospital.  In challenging the trial judge calling him to the stand, the 
respondent facing commitment in Matter of Baker unsuccessfully 
asserted that there was a violation of due process and the Fifth 
Amendment.85 
The protection of the right against self-incrimination by statute in 
some states is in stark contrast to states that refuse to recognize the 
right against self-incrimination in the civil commitment context by 
judicial decision.86 Other state legislatures should draft legislation to 
incorporate the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-
                                                                                                                 
 81. Oregon v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 88, 90 (Or. App. 1980).  However, such is the 
case in all civil contexts. The privilege applies wherever there is future prosecution or 
a threat or risk of future prosecution, and the statement reveals inculpatory 
information. 
 82. McNeil v. Patuxent Institution Director, 407 U.S. 254 (1972). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 91. 
 85. Matter of Baker, 324 N.W.2d 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
 86. See Appendix A. 
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incrimination in civil commitment proceedings.  The loss of liberty 
caused by the impact of a civil commitment decision requires states to 
act to extend the right against self-incrimination and the right to 
remain silent to the civil commitment context. 
In addition, the mentally ill person is often compelled to submit to 
a psychiatric evaluation, and the information so obtained is used 
against him in the civil commitment hearing. 87 In New Hampshire, 
the state Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination does not protect against giving evidence 
relating to civil commitment.88  The Court took a narrow view of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege and reasoned that the privilege only 
applies where the evidence elicited would result in a future criminal 
prosecution.89 The authority permitting mental health professionals to 
testify at civil commitment hearings also permits the mental health 
professional to base such testimony in large part on statements and 
conversation elicited from the person now subject to an involuntary 
civil commitment. 
III.  THE AUTHORITY OF A MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL TO 
TESTIFY AT A CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARING: CAN THE PATIENT 
PREVENT THE INTRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE 
COURSE OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION? 
As part of a state’s civil commitment process, the person subjected 
to involuntary confinement in a psychiatric hospital will be examined 
by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or physician to determine the need for 
forced confinement.90  Usually, the process starts in an emergency 
room setting, where the police91 or the person’s family members bring 
him for an emergency evaluation. At that time, an examination is 
conducted to determine if the mentally ill person is in need of 
hospitalization.92  This exam begins the process in which there are 
conversations between the patient and physicians, which form the 
basis for the evidence presented at an involuntary civil commitment 
hearing.93 Once admitted to the inpatient hospital, the patient is 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-619. 
 88. In re Field, 412 A.2d 1032 (N.H. 1980). 
 89. See id. 
 90. See, e.g., 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (providing that a physician of the 
facility shall examine the patient and determine the need for treatment); see also MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 632.335. 
 91. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-632(e). 
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examined by a hospital psychiatrist to determine the need for 
hospitalization.94 The patient then awaits a civil commitment hearing 
that takes place in two to ten days.95 During this time, the patient will 
undergo daily examinations and interviews with the treating 
psychiatrist who will present testimony at the civil commitment 
hearing seeking continued hospitalization.  The mentally ill person 
will have daily contact with mental health professionals who will be 
offering the patient treatment for his or her mental illness but who 
will also be providing testimony at the upcoming civil commitment 
hearing. On the one hand, the psychiatrist and patient will be 
establishing a trusting and therapeutic relationship, but on the other 
hand, lingering in the background is the psychiatrist’s need to develop 
evidence to prove the patient is a danger to self or others and in need 
of hospitalization. 
Can the patient prevent the psychiatrist from sharing the 
communication obtained during the psychiatrist-patient relationship?  
What privilege might apply to exclude certain testimony that is the 
subject of the civil commitment hearing? 
The Supreme Court first recognized the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in Jaffee v. Redmond.96  
In Jaffee the Court held that confidential communications between 
psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or 
treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501.97  The Court left the specific contours of the 
privilege up to the lower courts.98 The general approach is that the 
privilege is inapplicable to civil commitment proceedings.99 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-619. 
 95. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-83 (fourteen days); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.715 
(seventy-two hours); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-211 (three days). 
 96. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996). 
 97. Id.; Fed. R. Evid. 501. 
 98. In re Miller, 585 N.E.2d 396, 404 (Ohio 1992) (the psychiatrist testifying at the 
hearing was the patient’s treating physician). 
 99. See Walden Behavioral Care v. K.I., 2014 Mass. App. Div. 1 (2013) (holding 
that no warning is required as precondition to admissibility of patient-psychotherapist 
communications at civil commitment hearings, and testimonial privilege for patient-
psychotherapist communications does not apply to civil commitment proceedings); In 
re Sandra H., 846 A.2d 513 (N.H. 2004) (holding there was rational basis for treating 
civil committees and criminal committees differently, thus a statute making waiver of 
physician-patient privilege automatic for civil committees, and not for criminal 
committees, did not violate mental health patient’s equal protection rights); Matter of 
T.C.F., 400 N.W.2d 544, 549–550 (Iowa 1987) (holding state statutory privilege 
inapplicable to involuntary hospitalization proceedings on basis that the statute’s 
terms made it inapplicable to any civil action in which the condition of the person is 
element of claim or defense); People v. District Court, County of Adams, State of 
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Some jurisdictions render the privilege inapplicable by statute.100  
In Illinois, a person subjected to an involuntary commitment 
proceeding must first be notified that statements made to the 
evaluating practitioner may be used in the commitment hearing; 
failure to give this warning results in the inadmissibility of the 
testimony.101  Other states hold that the privilege is indeed applicable 
in the context of civil commitments, but it is limited to certain 
circumstances and does not apply where the testimony is based on 
information obtained in the course of the commitment evaluations.102  
Ohio is illustrative of this approach.103 
When a physician testified at a commitment hearing and the 
subject of the testimony was based on his ten-year relationship with 
the patient, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the testimonial 
privilege was applicable.104  The Court specifically held that Ohio’s 
statutory physician-patient privilege makes no exception for civil 
commitment proceedings and that such privilege applies “in the 
appropriate commitment situation[.]”105 
                                                                                                                 
Colo., 797 P.2d 1259 (1990) (holding privilege inapplicable where information is 
obtained in course of evaluating individual who is involuntarily committed); Matter 
of R., 641 P.2d 704 (Wash. 1982) (holding the physician-patient privilege did not 
apply in involuntary commitment proceedings where issue was whether further 
treatment was needed, and where patients had not been told that their psychiatrists 
were communicating with them solely for treatment purposes); SHIRLEY J. 
MCAULIFFE, 1 ARIZ. PRAC., LAW OF EVIDENCE § 501:7 (4th ed. 2014) (citing ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–36-3717 (2014)). (In Arizona, “the privilege does not 
apply to evaluation and treatment records sought in a proceeding for the civil 
commitment of a person pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Act. A.R.S. §§ 36-
3701 to 36-3717.”). 
 100. California’s evidence code contains a provision rending the privilege 
inapplicable in the context of civil commitments. 29B CAL. EVID. CODE § 1004. In 
involuntary civil commitment proceedings instituted in Texas, the physician-patient 
privilege is waived if the state seeks court-ordered treatment or probable cause for 
involuntary commitment to a mental health institution. TEX. R. EVID. 509(e)(6). 
However, the privilege applies in certain circumstances. See Salas v. State, 592 
S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding statute providing physician-patient 
communications are confidential applies to mental health commitments). 
 101. Matter of Collins, 429 N.E.2d 531 (Ill. 1981) (holding in involuntary 
commitment, an examining physician must first personally inform patient of his 
rights, in absence of which he will not be permitted to testify as to patient’s 
admissions at any subsequent court hearing). 
 102. See, e.g., People v. District Court, County of Adams, State of Colo., 797 P.2d 
1259 (1990). 
 103. See In re Miller, 585 N.E.2d 396, 404 (Ohio 1992). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 404–05 (noting that a different result may arise if the testimony of the 
physician was limited to facts learned in the course of evaluating the patient for the 
present commitment only). 
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In reaching its holding, the Ohio court noted that the privilege is 
inapplicable to civil commitment proceedings in many states.106 The 
court also noted that the best practice is to have an independent 
physician examine the patient in conjunction with a civil commitment 
proceeding.107  However, in a different case, where the patient did not 
consult the testifying physician for treatment but instead was “forced 
to undergo examination and treatment as part of the judicial 
hospitalization procedures[,]” the privilege is not applicable.108 
As a reasonable compromise of competing interests, from the 
patient’s right of privacy and confidence in the psychotherapist-
patient relationship to the state’s obligation to provide treatment for 
the dangerously mentally ill, the psychiatrist should provide 
documentation that the patient was advised that any statements made 
to the psychiatrist during the course of the evaluation or treatment 
may be used against the person at the civil commitment hearing. 
Additionally, the patient should be provided with a written statement 
advising him or her that statements made to the hospital psychiatrist 
can be repeated at the civil commitment hearing. In the alternative, 
the psychiatrist should be required to provide written documentation 
in the medical record that such a disclosure was provided to the 
patient at the start of their relationship. Without such a finding, the 
treating psychiatrist should be required to limit testimony of the 
patient’s behavior based exclusively on what was reasonably observed 
by the psychiatrist and not what was told to him by the patient in 
confidence. 
IV.  THE APPLICABILITY OF EVIDENCE RULES AND THE USE OF 
HEARSAY AT THE COMMITMENT HEARING 
It is often said that the rules of evidence at a civil commitment 
hearing are loosely applied.109 The most controversial evidentiary 
issue in administrative adjudications involves the treatment of 
hearsay.110  Often testimony presented at the civil commitment 
hearing relies on declarations of family members, employers, 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 404 (“Responding to these and other considerations, a number of states 
expressly render the privilege inapplicable in civil commitment proceedings. See, e.g., 
29B CAL. EVID. CODE § 1004 (1996). Other states reach the same result by providing 
that the privilege does not apply when a person’s mental condition is at issue.”). 
 107. Id. at 405.    
 108. In re Winstead, 425 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ohio 1980). 
 109. For a table of authority illustrating various states’ approaches to the 
applicability of evidentiary rules to civil commitment hearings, see Appendix B. 
 110. See ARNOLD ROCHVARG, MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (MICPEL 2d. 
ed. 2007). 
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neighbors, mental health professionals, police, and other interested 
individuals who interacted with the mentally ill person prior to the 
hospital confinement. The state often follows its state’s 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in addressing contested cases, 
including evidentiary issues.111  The Maryland APA provides that 
“evidence may not be excluded solely on the basis that it is 
hearsay.”112  At the civil commitment hearing, the hospital relies 
heavily on hearsay in presenting evidence on the patient’s recent 
behavior and need for current hospitalization. The decision to commit 
a patient to a psychiatric hospital must be supported by substantial 
evidence and must comport with due process.  In order to satisfy the 
substantial evidence test, there must be sufficiently probative and 
reliable evidence.  The “hearsay evidence must demonstrate sufficient 
reliability and probative value to satisfy the requirement of 
procedural due process.”113  The significant nature of the matter in 
dispute, the freedom of the mentally ill person, should raise concerns 
regarding the reliance on hearsay as the sole basis for the decision to 
retain the person in a psychiatric hospital. 
There are twenty-nine states that have addressed the issue of the 
applicability of evidentiary rules at the civil commitment hearing.114  
Of those states, nineteen appear to require that the rules of evidence 
apply during the commitment hearing,115 six apply the rules of 
evidence on an explicitly informal basis,116 and four states have 
express statutory provisions that provide that the hearing officer is 
not bound by the rules of evidence.117  Two states, New Jersey118 and 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T § 10-213. 
 112. See, e.g., id. 
 113. Travers v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 693 A.2d 378 (Mt. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). 
 114. See Appendix B for a table of state law on applicability of the rules of 
evidence to involuntary commitment hearings. 
 115. ALA. CODE 1975 § 22-52-9; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17A-498; IDAHO CODE § 
66-329; KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55; ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. TIT. 34-B, § 3864; MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73; MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-955; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-
27.33; In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548 (Pa. Super. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8; TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN §574.031; UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A –15– 631; 18 
VERMONT STAT. ANN. § 7615; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.310; W. VA. CODE, § 
27-5-4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20. 
 116. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735; IDAHO CODE § 66-329; MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335; 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-570. 
 117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.4; IOWA CODE § 229.12 3; KAN.  STAT. ANN. § 
59-2959; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07; In re Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. App. 
2004). 
 118. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.33. 
2016]CRACKS IN THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS809 
Kentucky,119 are notable for their express statutory requirements that 
the same rules of evidence that are applicable in criminal cases apply 
at the civil commitment hearing. 
As part of the psychiatrist’s testimony at the civil commitment 
hearing, information such as the police interaction at the initial 
incident that led to the present hospitalization, the examination at the 
emergency room where the patient was initially transported for 
evaluation, as well as conversations with family members becomes 
central to the psychiatrist’s testimony.120 The patient who is subject to 
involuntary hospitalization is denied the opportunity to cross-examine 
the key individuals, whether the police, emergency room staff, or 
family members, when the testifying psychiatrist offers statements 
from said individuals as part of his testimony at the hearing.  The 
right to confront witnesses as provided in the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution121 is denied in the civil commitment 
arena. In the case of In re Irwin, the Court found that the 
confrontation clause is not applicable in civil commitment 
proceedings.122 Due to the serious liberty interests impacted in the 
civil commitment hearings, it is recommended that the rules of 
evidence are more strictly followed at civil commitment hearings and 
that the Confrontation Clause apply.  The rampant hearsay offered at 
civil commitment hearings should be drastically reduced, requiring an 
overwhelming showing of reliability before such hearsay testimony is 
considered. 
In consideration of the significant deprivation of freedom as well as 
the stigma associated with an involuntary civil commitment, it is 
recommended that other states follow the New Jersey and Kentucky 
approach to the treatment of hearsay and the rules of evidence 
generally. The confinement against one’s will is more akin to the 
criminal consequences of punishment than to pure treatment, 
necessitating greater adherence to due process, specifically with the 
applicability of the rules of evidence. Where other due process 
protections are severally limited or even completely lacking, at the 
very least the decision to deprive a person of his freedom should be 
based on reliable evidence that possesses adequate guarantees of 
trustworthiness and accuracy. 
                                                                                                                 
 119. KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076. 
 120. See In re Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. App. 2004). 
 121. U.S. CONST., AMEND. VI. 
 122. In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
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V.  THE BURDEN OF PROOF STANDARD EMPLOYED IN THE CIVIL 
COMMITMENT HEARING 
In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court announced the 
minimum burden of proof in civil commitment hearings as the clear 
and convincing standard.123  The Court recognized the adverse social 
consequences to an individual from an involuntary commitment to a 
mental hospital in setting a minimum standard above the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.124  The Court further held 
that the precise burden to be used must be equal to or greater than 
the clear and convincing standard but is a matter of state law.125 
Following the Addington decision, several states selected the criminal 
standard of proof, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, for civil 
commitments.126 
Kentucky requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the 
hospitalization of the mentally ill.127  In Hawaii, the criteria for 
whether the person subject to involuntary hospitalization has a 
mental illness likewise must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.128  
A third state, Montana, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
with respect to any physical facts of evidence and clear and 
convincing evidence as to all other matters.129  Additionally, like 
Kentucky, Montana requires the existence of the person’s mental 
disorder to be proved to a reasonable medical certainty.130 
In addition to these state legislatures enacting the higher standard 
of proof, at least one state has done the same by judicial measures.131  
In Massachusetts, the court in Commonwealth v. Nassar mandated 
that a mentally ill person shall not be involuntarily committed unless 
the person’s release would create a substantial risk of harm to other 
persons and that such substantial risk must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.132 
The loss of liberty and serious stigma attached to the involuntary 
civil commitment of a person with mental illness should necessitate 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. at 443. 
 126. KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076(2); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126; HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 334-60.3; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.6. 
 127. KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076(2). 
 128. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.3. 
 129. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Com. v. Nassar  406 N.E.2d 1286 (1980). 
 132. Id. 
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the requirement that all criteria for retention in a psychiatric hospital 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  State legislatures are 
encouraged to adopt this higher standard as proof, as required in the 
criminal context.133 
VI.  THE RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION 
In a typical civil commitment hearing, testimony regarding the 
mentally ill person’s need for inpatient psychiatric hospitalization is 
usually provided by the hospital psychiatrist.134 The testifying 
psychiatrist is in a unique position, having a current understanding of 
the person’s psychiatric condition and behavior based on being the 
expert charged with treating the patient. 
What is more, courts are extremely deferential to the expertise of 
the treating psychiatrist, especially on the prediction that the person 
poses a danger to oneself or others. Occasionally a family member 
may testify at the civil commitment hearing, describing recent 
behavior on the part of the mentally ill person that justified the 
request for hospitalization, although the family member frequently 
testifies on behalf of the hospital. 
The patient’s case in chief is usually the testimony of the patient 
himself.  Understanding that the judge may often discredit the 
testimony of the patient as lacking insight into his illness or view the 
patient as in denial over his illness, it is likely that judges often receive 
a distorted picture of the patient’s condition.  In order to level the 
playing field and offer an objective perspective on the important 
issues of whether there is a less restrictive alternative to inpatient 
hospitalization and whether there is a risk of danger to self or others 
if the person is released, several states have provided for the right to 
an independent psychiatric evaluation.135 
                                                                                                                 
 133. For a table of current state laws regarding the burden of proof applicable to 
an involuntary civil commitment hearing, see Appendix C. 
 134. See e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-619. 
 135. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-538; N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 25-03.1-02; ALASKA 
STAT. § 47.30.745; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1463; MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. 123 § 
5; COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-127; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, 
§ 5007; FLA. STAT. ANN. §394.467; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8; 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 
5/3-804; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 34-B, § 3864; MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 253B.07; MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-118; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-908; 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15; ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.110; S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
17-530; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.14; 18 Vermont Stat. Ann. §§ 7113, 7114; 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360; W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20. 
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In Florida and Texas the court may order an independent 
evaluation if the evaluation will assist the fact finder.136  Illinois and 
Michigan also provide for the right to an independent clinical 
evaluation at public expense for indigent individuals.137  Several states 
permit the selection of the independent evaluator to be a person of 
the mentally ill person’s own choice.138 
The opportunity to receive an independent evaluation to counter 
the testimony of the hospital’s treating psychiatrist is imperative.  The 
independent evaluator’s ability to attend and testify at the civil 
commitment hearing is a significant benefit to the patient, resulting in 
the presentation of alternatives to inpatient hospitalization, in 
addition to a different perspective of the mentally ill person’s 
dangerousness.139  The civil commitment hearing, thus, begins to 
conform to the standards of due process when the judge hears opinion 
testimony from two psychiatrists who offer their perspective on the 
need, or not, for inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. 
It is strongly recommended that all states provide the right to an 
independent psychiatric evaluation.  These evaluations should be free 
of charge for indigent persons, and the evaluator should be able to 
testify at the civil commitment hearing.  It is also encouraged that the 
independent psychiatrist be permitted to observe the mentally ill 
person in the hospital setting for a reasonable period of time to be in 
the best position to respond to the opinion of the hospital psychiatrist, 
whose testimony at the hearing is generally to advocate for in-patient 
hospitalization. 
VII.  ALTERNATIVES TO THE ADVERSARIAL CIVIL COMMITMENT 
HEARING 
The current approach to addressing the involuntary civil 
commitment of a mentally ill person is through an adversarial hearing 
before a judge.  The mentally ill person is represented by counsel, and 
the state has its representative at the hearing.140  The trier of fact will 
hear testimony and evidence and make a determination on whether 
or not to confine the mentally ill person in a psychiatric hospital. 
                                                                                                                 
 136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(6)(a)(2); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
574.010. 
 137. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-804; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1463. 
 138. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-118. 
 139. For a complete state by state listing of the right to independent evaluations, 
see Appendix D. 
 140. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(3). 
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Alternatives to the adversarial model are hard to find. Mediation, 
however, is rarely utilized. Is it the unequal bargaining position 
between the hospital and the patient that necessitates an adversarial 
proceeding over mediation?  Or is there a belief that there is not a 
workable compromise available?  Either you are confined in a 
hospital setting for an indefinite period of time or you are not.  
Should we take a closer look at alternatives to the current civil 
commitment hearing that may result in better outcomes for people 
with mental illness? 
Mediation involves a neutral third party assisting conflicted parties, 
the patient and the hospital, by expanding communication between 
said parties.  Often, there is a conflict over the length of stay in the 
hospital, whereby a patient may feel more comfortable with a fixed 
end day while the hospital may prefer an open-ended discharge day. 
Mediation may be able to facilitate discussion on the length of the 
hospital stay, which might also include day passes to leave the 
hospital temporarily.141 
Another source of conflict may involve the specific psychotropic 
medication being prescribed.  The mediation may offer a better 
setting to reach consensus on the specific medication, explaining the 
purpose, benefits, and side effects, as well as possible alternatives.  
Rather than leaving the specific medication regiment in the hands of 
the treating psychiatrist, the mediator may be able to propose certain 
medication approaches that lead a patient to accept his or her 
treatment options voluntarily, rather than being coerced into 
accepting them.142 
Furthermore, mediation may be capable of offering alternatives to 
the involuntary hospitalization option, such as discharge to a less 
restrictive setting or a postponement or delay to more fully explore 
alternatives.  The hospital psychiatrist may be more inclined to accept 
discharge to a less restrictive setting if the mediation can encourage 
dialogue surrounding an out-patient plan, including housing and 
treatment.  “Mediation may provide an opportunity for people with 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation and Alternative 
Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833, 837 (2004) (discussing 
benefits of mediation). 
 142. For example, the patient may prefer a specific medication among medications 
of the same class due to side-effects.  At mediation, the exact medications, or choices 
of medications, may be stipulated. 
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mental illness to fashion the appropriate treatment for their needs 
without undergoing involuntary confinement.”143 
It is encouraged that, prior to the involuntary civil commitment 
hearing being conducted, an offer should be made to explore 
mediation as an alternative to addressing the treatment needs of a 
mentally ill person. 
VIII.  OTHER THAN THE MENTALLY ILL PERSON, WHO SHOULD BE 
PERMITTED TO CONSENT TO IN-PATIENT TREATMENT?: 
GUARDIAN, POWER OF ATTORNEY OR PARENT 
Should a legal guardian be permitted to voluntarily admit a 
mentally ill person to a psychiatric hospital?144  What about a person 
with a power of attorney voluntarily admitting a person under her 
care?  Should a person be permitted to draft an advance directive 
relating to mental health services for himself? 
Most states provide for the admission of an individual to a 
psychiatric hospital through the voluntary admission process.145  
Maryland, for example, requires the patient to meet five criteria: (1) 
the individual has a mental disorder; (2) the mental disorder is 
susceptible to care or treatment; (3) the individual understands the 
nature of the request for admission; (4) the individual is able to give 
continuous consent to retention in the facility; and (5) the individual 
is able to ask for release.146 
In the context of a third party seeking voluntary admission of a 
mentally ill person, the third party is not bound by these statutory 
considerations, which serve as important safeguards for the mentally 
ill person. When a substitute decision maker, such as a guardian or 
person with a power of attorney or durable power of attorney through 
a living will, makes the decision to seek voluntary admission of the 
mentally ill person on whose behalf they act, the voluntary admission 
process is compromised.  Moreover, while there may be benefits of 
voluntary admission over involuntary admission, such as less stigma 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Henry Chen, Current Development 2005-2006: The Mediation Approach: 
Representing Clients with Mental Illness in Civil Commitment 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 599, 612 (2006). 
 144. For a table of authority regarding a guardian’s ability to make mental health 
care decisions for his or her ward, see Appendix E. 
 145. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.04. 
 146. MD. COD ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-609(c). 
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and more cooperation between the patient and the hospital, there is a 
clear lack of judicial or attorney oversight.147 
The requirement that the individual involved in the voluntary 
admission must understand the nature of the request for admission or 
be able to give continuous assent to retention by the facility is often 
ignored when a hospital accepts the request by a third-party decision 
maker. 
There are some states that recognize guardians who are authorized 
to make decisions for the health care of an individual when the 
individual is incapable of making an informed decision.148  However, 
in Maryland, the Health Care Decision Act expressly forbids a 
surrogate from authorizing treatment for a mental disorder.149 
The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, 
followed by thirty states,150 prohibits guardians from committing an 
individual to a mental health facility except in accordance with the 
state’s procedure for involuntary civil commitment.151  Persons with a 
power of attorney, who are authorized to make hospital and personal 
decisions, might also be authorized by the power of attorney to make 
the choice to voluntarily admit the individual under their care. 152  
When the person with the power of attorney seeks out a voluntary 
admission of the mentally ill individual to a psychiatric hospital, but 
such admission is opposed by the mentally ill individual, the state 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See Donald Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric 
Hospitalization: Myth or Reality?, 9 BOS. U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25 (1999). 
 148. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. §-605(a)(2) surrogates priority are guardians 
if appointed spouse or domestic  partner, adult child, parent, sibling of the patient or 
friend or other relative. 
 149. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. §-605(d). 
 150. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5312.01; ARK. CODE ANN. § 
28-65-303; CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-316; CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 45A- 656; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 12, § 3922; D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2047.01; 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215; HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-316; 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 
5/11A-17; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. ART. 4566; MD. 
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 708; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 190B, § 5-309; MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 524.5-315; MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.120; MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-322; 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-56; N.Y. MENTAL 
HYGIENE LAW § 81.22; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-28-12 (5-312); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. TIT. 30, § 3-119; OR. REV. STAT. § 125.320; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521; TEX. 
EST. CODE § 1151.053; VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 14, § 3074; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
11.92.043; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-202. See also Hawaii, 
Minnesota, and New Jersey. 
 151. Karna Sandler, A Guardian’s Health Care Decision-Making Authority: 
Statutory Restrictions, 35 BIFOCAL 106, 107 (2014). 
 152. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18-A, § 5-312 (providing that guardian “may 
place the ward in any hospital or other institution for care in the same manner as 
otherwise provided by law.”). 
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should utilize its involuntary civil commitment process rather than the 
voluntary admission process.  States should be prohibited from 
allowing a person with power of attorney from seeking voluntary 
admission of a mentally ill person under his or her care when opposed 
by the mentally ill person, as this admission is clearly not voluntary. 
Another mechanism for circumventing the involuntary admission 
process is through the use of advance directives.  In Maryland, the 
Health Care Decision Act permits an individual to create an advance 
directive153 for mental health services.154  The advance directive takes 
effect upon a finding by two physicians that the person is incapable of 
making an informed decision about treatment.155  When the 
individual has expressed disagreement with the action of seeking 
voluntary admission to a psychiatric hospital, the hospital should 
proceed through the state’s involuntary admission process.156 
When the mentally ill individual has expressed no opinion as to the 
voluntary admission to a psychiatric hospital requested by a person 
designated with authority under the directive, hospitals are often in a 
dilemma as far as the validity of their authority to proceed with a 
voluntary hospital admission.  In Cohen v. Bolduc, the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts declared that absent an express limitation, an 
agent is authorized to endorse a voluntary admission on behalf of an 
individual in situations where he does not object to treatment.157  The 
court authorized the power to voluntarily admit the mentally ill 
person to a mental health facility.158  The Court reasoned that 
permitting a guardian to consent to admission ensured respect for the 
patient’s autonomy insofar as it honors the patient’s previous 
decision.  However, the Court failed to recognize the potential that a 
patient could change his or her mind and no longer wishes to 
authorize inpatient hospitalization.159  Moreover, authorizing 
                                                                                                                 
 153. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“advance directive” as “[a] document that takes effect upon one’s incompetency and 
designates a surrogate decision-maker for healthcare matters”). 
 154. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 5-602.1 (2015). Such directives may provide 
for various specifications, including the designation of an agent to make mental 
health services decisions, the identification of a mental health facility to provide 
services, preferred medications, and notification to third parties. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 5-611(e)(2); see also 91 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 
3 (2006) (advocating to prohibit an application for voluntary admission if the patient 
“has expressed disagreement with the action”). 
 157. Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714 (Mass. 2002).  For a comprehensive 
education of state guardianship laws, see Appendix E. 
 158. Id. at 719. 
 159. Id. at 722. 
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substitute decision makers to consent to such admissions bypasses due 
process to ensure that the patient is truly incompetent to make the 
decision for his or her self.  Several states have prohibited the use of 
advance directives for voluntary admission.160 
With the variation of state approaches regarding the authority of 
an advance directive with respect to voluntary psychiatric hospital 
admission, there is a need for a more thoughtful, unified approach.  In 
situations where the mentally ill person has expressed opposition to a 
voluntary admission, the state should be required to proceed through 
the involuntary admission process.  When the person subject to the 
voluntary admission has expressed no opinion, the designated agent 
should be permitted to proceed with the voluntary hospitalization 
subject to specific mandatory requirements. First, an attorney should 
be appointed to represent the interests of the mentally ill person. The 
hospital should evaluate its ability to provide inpatient treatment. 
Second, a judge should review the case to determine if the mentally ill 
person is in favor of or opposed to the voluntary admission, 
determine if the person would benefit from hospitalization, and limit 
the inpatient admission to thirty days.  If an extension beyond thirty 
days is sought, a second judicial review should be required, with the 
patient again represented by counsel. 
With the increase in advance directives that include mental health 
services decisions, states should require a judicial review and scrutiny 
of the voluntary admission processes.  In those states that permit 
advance directives to include inpatient mental health hospitalization, 
the requirement of judicial review will ensure the interests of the 
mentally ill person are protected but will still permit voluntary 
hospitalization when necessary and appropriate. 
IX.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO REPAIR THE BROKEN INVOLUNTARY 
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS 
Recognizing the liberty interests at stake in civil commitment 
decisions, it is crucial that our state commitment laws reflect the 
paramount imperative that the due process rights of mentally ill 
persons are protected.  For individuals with mental illness who pose a 
danger to themselves or others and are in need of treatment, the 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Alabama (ALA. CODE 1975 § 26-1-2); California (CAL. PROBATE CODE § 
4682); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-7); 
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03); Nevada (N.R.S. 162A.700); New 
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. § 137-J:5); Texas (V.T.C.A., CIVIL PRACTICE & 
REMEDIES CODE § 137.001); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.01) and Wyoming 
(WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-302). 
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challenge is to furnish the necessary care while protecting their 
constitutional right to be treated in a humane setting with the due 
process protections we afford those who are confined against their 
will. 
The following are recommendations to guide state legislatures in 
developing and implementing an enlightened, comprehensive, and 
fair involuntary civil commitment statute for the mentally ill citizens 
facing involuntary confinement. 
1. Provide that all persons facing civil commitment are entitled to 
the right to remain silent. 
2. Extend the applicability of the Miranda warning rights to 
police involved in the civil commitment patient 
3. Provide that all persons facing civil commitment are entitled to 
the right against self-incrimination insofar as they may refuse to 
testify at the hearing. 
4. Provide that mentally ill persons are entitled to the privilege of 
confidentiality between psychiatrist and patient, extending such 
privilege to civil commitment hearings. 
5. Require the burden of proof in involuntary civil commitment 
hearings to be the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
6. Require the formal rules of evidence to apply to the civil 
commitment hearings, including the rule against hearsay. 
7. Provide all persons facing involuntary civil commitment 
hearings a right to an independent psychiatric evaluation and at state 
expense if indigent. 
8. Offer the option of mediation as an alternative dispute 
resolution to the contested involuntary commitment hearing. 
9. Require a judge to review all voluntary admissions to an 
inpatient psychiatric hospital, including those sought by the patient, 
guardian, or health care agent. 
The involuntary civil commitment process is under great scrutiny 
today, with some seeking greater protection while others are seeking 
a relaxation of rights afforded in the adversarial system. With 
significant media coverage of persons with mental illness involved in 
recent tragedies, from the Virginia Tech massacre161 to the Aurora, 
Colorado, movie theater shootings,162 there is a call for loosening the 
procedures for committing a dangerously mentally ill person to a 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See Virginia Tech Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 13, 2015, 12:03 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com /2013/10/31/us/virginia-tech-shootings-fast-facts/. 
 162. See Aurora Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
news/aurora-shooting/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
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psychiatric hospital.  Clearly, there is a need for greater outpatient 
mental health treatment options, as well as suitable housing 
arrangements for persons with mental illness. However, to reduce the 
protections for the mentally ill person facing involuntary civil 
commitment, or to make the process more convenient for the state, is 
both short-sighted and counterproductive. Moreover, it is a violation 
of a person’s liberty.  We, as a society, should provide greater 
protections to the mentally ill, ensuring that involuntary inpatient 
hospitalization is truly a last resort when all less restrictive forms of 
intervention are either inappropriate or unavailable. 
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APPENDIX A: RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT, AGAINST 
COMPELLED TESTIMONY, OR AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 22-52-9 (2016): Right not to be compelled to 
testify against self. 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(b)(8) (2016): Right to remain 
silent. 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-211 (2016): Right to remain 
silent. 
California Conservatorship of Bones, 234 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Ct. App. 
1987): At post-certification treatment hearing (for 
extended commitment) county attorney moved to call 
appellant-patient as a witness and the trial court granted 
the motion. The trial court issued orders remanding 
Appellant to hospital. Appellant appealed, arguing inter 
alia it was an error to compel him to testify.  In analogizing 
the present case to a line of precedent cases where a 
criminal defendant’s privilege not to testify was not 
extended to parties in non-criminal proceedings, the 
California Court of Appeals held that the trial court did 
not err in ordering Appellant to testify at his post-
certification treatment hearing. 
Colorado People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980): On appeal of 
a dismissal of hearing to confirm certification of 
respondent for short-term treatment, the Colorado 
Supreme Court distinguished civil commitment process 
from criminal proceedings, holding “due process does not 
require that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination be extended to Colorado’s civil commitment 
proceedings to bar the respondent from being called upon 
to testify or to justify her absence from court during the 
certification proceedings.” Id. at 1138–39. 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16, § 5006 (2016): Privilege against 
self-incrimination is applicable to all proceedings under 
this chapter. 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (West 2016): Patient may 
refuse to testify at the hearing. 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-60.5 (West 2016): Nothing in 
this section shall limit persons’ privilege against self-
incrimination. 
Illinois In re Nolan, 384 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978): Nolan 
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appealed adjudication that he was in need of mental 
treatment, arguing that it was constitutionally 
impermissible for the state to call him as an adverse 
witness. The Appellate Court of Illinois held that 
“involuntary commitment proceedings do not encompass 
the right against self-incrimination . . . thus one who is 
subject to such matters may be called as an adverse 
witness” and, furthermore, that so calling him as a witness 
does not violate guarantees to effective assistance of 
counsel. Id. at 135–36.  The holding was based on the 
rationale that accepting Nolan’s arguments “would 
obscure the differentiation between a criminal trial and an 
involuntary civil commitment.” Id. at 136. 
Indiana State ex rel. Kiritsis v. Marion Probate Court, 381 N.E.2d 
1245 (Ind. 1978): Patient petitioned to Supreme Court of 
Indiana for a writ of mandate and prohibition asking for 
the Court to order the Probate Court to recognize patient’s 
right to remain silent. The Indiana Supreme Court held 
that the privilege against self-incrimination has no 
applicability in civil commitment proceedings on that 
rationale that “the fact that a proceeding may result in the 
deprivation of liberty does not automatically invoke the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment” and “the legitimate 
objectives of the statute and the interests of the State 
would be wholly frustrated were individuals permitted to 
claim the privilege in civil commitment proceedings.” Id. at 
1247–48. 
Massachusetts Commonwealth. v. Barboza, 438 N.E.2d 1064 (Mass 1982): 
Miranda warnings were not required; Fifth Amendment 
was not violated by use of respondent’s statement to his 
psychiatrist. 
Michigan In re Baker, 324 N.W.2d 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982): Over 
counsel’s objections, appellant was called to the stand and 
questioned by the judge pertaining to issues relating to 
commitment of appellant. Appellant was subsequently 
committed. The Court of Appeals held that trial court did 
not violate appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights forcing him 
to testify against himself. The Court based its holding on 
the rationale that “the receipt of testimony from the 
respondent in a commitment hearing can be analogized to 
the admissibility of physical evidence, as opposed to 
testimonial evidence, at a criminal trial” and “[n]o witness 
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has the privilege to refuse to reveal to a trier of fact 
pertinent physical or mental characteristics where they are 
relevant to issues under consideration.” Id. at 94. 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73 (2016): Privilege against self-
incrimination. 
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335 (West 2016): Right to remain 
silent. 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115 (West 2016): Any person 
who is involuntarily detained or against whom petition is 
filed has the right to remain silent. 
New 
Hampshire 
In re Field, 412 A.2d 1032 (N.H. 1980): Patient argued that 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
would be violated if he was compelled to submit to a 
psychiatric evaluation and the information so obtained was 
used against him. The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not protect against giving evidence 
relating to civil commitments. As long as those 
proceedings do not seek to elicit evidence that may result 
in any criminal prosecution, there is no privilege. 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.33a (West 2016): The rules of 
evidence applicable in criminal cases shall apply, and all 
constitutional rights available to a defendant at a criminal 
trial, other than the right to a trial by jury and the right not 
to be tried while incompetent, shall apply. 
New York Ughetto v. Acrish, 494 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985), affirmed as 
modified 518 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1987), appeal dismissed 518 
N.E.2d 8 (1987), reconsideration denied 521 N.E.2d 438 
(1988): Patient’s privilege against self-incrimination did not 
apply to prevent hospital from using patient’s statements 
made in course of prehearing psychiatric interview and 
medical conclusions drawn therefrom to support 
application for involuntary civil commitment. 
North Carolina French v. Blackbum, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977): 
Plaintiff challenged state involuntary commitment 
procedures on the basis that they violate the Fifth 
Amendment because, inter alia, they fail require that the 
respondent be advised of his right against self-
incrimination. A three-judge federal district court panel 
held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not 
apply to involuntary commitment proceedings on the basis 
that “to apply the privilege to the type of proceedings here 
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challenged would be to destroy the valid purposes which 
they serve as it would make them unworkable and 
ineffective.”  
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (West 2016): The 
respondent has the right, but shall not be compelled, to 
testify, and shall be so advised by the court. 
Oklahoma In re D.J.L., 964 P.2d 983 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998): Patient 
appealed order of involuntary civil commitment arguing, 
inter alia, the trial court improperly overruled his 
objections to being called as a witness. Oklahoma Court of 
Civil Appeals affirmed the order, holding “that there is no 
constitutional right against self-incrimination in an 
involuntary commitment proceeding and that Oklahoma 
law allows the State to call the person alleged to be 
requiring treatment in support of its case.” Id. at 984. 
Oregon In re Matthews, 613 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1980): Patient 
appealed Circuit Court order of commitment. Court of 
Appeals held that due process did not require that he be 
afforded right to remain silent if his testimony might be 
used as a basis for commitment. 
Pennsylvania 50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304(e) (West 
2016): A hearing on a petition for court-ordered 
involuntary treatment shall be conducted such that a 
patient shall not be called as a witness without his consent. 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.19 (2016): The person 
may appear personally at any hearing and testify on his 
own behalf, but the person may not be compelled to do so. 
Tennessee In re Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983): 
Patient appealed the commitment order, asserting 
violations of her federal constitutional rights. The 
Tennessee Court of Appeals held that “proceedings under 
the judicial hospitalization statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 33–
604, are civil in nature and are not criminal for Fifth 
Amendment purposes.” 
Vermont State v. McCarty, 892 A.2d 250 (Vt. 2006): Defendant was 
charged with truancy for failing to send her child to school 
and was subsequently arrested after an FTA with added 
charges of resisting arrest. The trial court ordered a 
psychiatric evaluation over defendant’s objections to 
determine her competency to stand trial. Following a series 
of more FTAs, charges/arrests, and court-ordered 
evaluations, the defendant was deemed incompetent, 
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insane, and was eventually ordered to involuntary 
treatment based on testimony of an examining physician. 
The defendant appealed the order, claiming that her 
statements to the examining physician could not be used 
against her in support of an involuntary commitment 
order. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that once the 
defendant was deemed incompetent, she was no longer at 
risk for punishment and therefore her privilege against 
self-incrimination was not implicated. Id. at 254. However, 
the court noted that if such statements later surfaced in a 
proceeding that could expose the speaker to potential 
punishment, speaker could invoke her privilege to exclude 
statements. Id. 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360(8) (West 2016): At 
the probable cause hearing the detained person shall have 
the right to remain silent. 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4(h)(4) (West 2016): The 
individual may not be compelled to be a witness against 
himself or herself.  
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 2016): Right to remain 
silent. 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-109 (2016): At the time of 
emergency detention the person shall be informed orally 
and in writing of his right to contact his family and an 
attorney, of his right to appointed counsel if he is indigent, 
of his right to remain silent and that his statements may be 
used as a basis for involuntary hospitalization. 
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APPENDIX B: APPLICABILITY OF EVIDENCE RULES AND USE OF 
HEARSAY AT COMMITMENT HEARING 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 22-52-9(5) (2016): The rules of evidence 
applicable in other judicial proceedings in this state shall be 
followed in involuntary commitment proceedings. 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(b)(4) (2016): At the 
hearing . . . the respondent has the right to have the rules of 
evidence and civil procedure applied so as to provide for 
the informal but efficient presentation of evidence. 
California CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.4 (West 2016): (b)The 
hearing shall be conducted in an impartial and informal 
manner in order to encourage free and open discussion by 
participants.  The person conducting the hearing shall not 
be bound by rules of procedure or evidence applicable in 
judicial proceedings . . . (d) All evidence which is relevant 
to establishing that the person certified is or is not as a 
result of mental disorder or impairment by chronic 
alcoholism, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or 
gravely disabled, shall be admitted at the hearing and 
considered by the hearing officer. (e) Although resistance 
to involuntary commitment may be a product of a mental 
disorder, this resistance shall not, in itself, imply the 
presence of a mental disorder or constitute evidence that a 
person meets the criteria of being dangerous to self or 
others, or gravely disabled. 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498(h) (West 2016): The 
rules of evidence applicable to civil matters in the Superior 
Court shall apply to hearings under this section. 
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 66-329(10) (2016): The hearing shall be 
conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent 
with orderly procedure.  The court shall receive all relevant 
and material evidence consistent with the rules of evidence. 
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.12 3.a. (West 2016): The 
respondent’s welfare shall be paramount and the hearing 
shall be conducted in as informal a manner as may be 
consistent with orderly procedure, but consistent therewith 
the issue shall be tried as a civil matter. Such discovery as is 
permitted under the Iowa rules of civil procedure shall be 
available to the respondent.  The court shall receive all 
relevant and material evidence which may be offered and 
need not be bound by the rules of evidence. 
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Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2959(c) (West 2016): The court shall 
receive all relevant and material evidence which may be 
offered. The rules governing evidentiary and procedural 
matters shall be applied to hearings under this section in a 
manner so as to facilitate informal, efficient presentation of 
all relevant, probative evidence and resolution of issues 
with due regard to the interests of all parties. 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076(2) (West 2016): The manner of 
proceeding and rules of evidence shall be the same as those 
in any criminal proceeding including the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Louisiana LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(D) (2016): . . .  court shall conduct 
the hearing in as formal a manner as is possible under the 
circumstances and shall admit evidence according to the 
usual rules of evidence. 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864(c) (2016): The court 
shall receive all relevant and material evidence that may be 
offered in accordance with accepted rules of evidence and 
accepted judicial dispositions. 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1459(2) (West 2016): The 
court shall receive all relevant, competent, and material 
evidence which may be offered. The rules of evidence in 
civil actions are applicable, except to the extent that specific 
exceptions have been provided for in this chapter or 
elsewhere by statute or court rule. 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07 (West 2016): Subd. 7. 
Preliminary hearing. . . . (b) court may admit reliable 
hearsay evidence, including written reports, for the purpose 
of the preliminary hearing. 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(3) (2016): The rules of 
evidence applicable in other judicial proceedings in this 
state shall be followed. 
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335(2) (West 2016): The hearing 
shall be conducted in as informal a manner as may be 
consistent with orderly procedure and in a physical setting 
not likely to have a harmful effect on the respondent. Due 
consideration shall be given by the court to holding a 
hearing at the mental health facility. The respondent shall 
have the following rights in addition to those specified 
elsewhere: . . . (7) To be proceeded against according to the 
rules of evidence applicable to civil judicial proceedings; 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.425 (West 2016). Physician-patient, 
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psychologist-patient privileges waived in detention 
proceedings. The physician-patient privilege recognized by 
section 491.060 and the psychologist-patient privilege 
recognized by section 337.055 shall be deemed waived in 
detention proceedings under this chapter. The fact that such 
privileges have been waived pursuant to this section does 
not by itself waive the privileges in any other proceeding, 
civil or criminal. The waiver of the privileges shall extend 
only to that evidence which is directly material and relevant 
to detention proceedings. 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115 (West 2016): . . . any person 
who is involuntarily detained or against whom a petition is 
filed pursuant to this part has the following 
rights: . . . (7) . . . the right in any hearing to be proceeded 
against according to the rules of evidence applicable to civil 
matters generally. 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-955 (West 2016): The rules of 
evidence applicable in civil proceedings shall apply at all 
hearings held under the Nebraska Mental Health 
Commitment Act. In no event shall evidence be considered 
which is inadmissible in criminal proceedings. 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.33a (West 2016): The rules of 
evidence applicable in criminal cases shall apply, and all 
constitutional rights available to a defendant at a criminal 
trial, other than the right to a trial by jury and the right not 
to be tried while incompetent, shall apply. 
North 
Carolina 
In re Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004): 
Hearing before magistrate upon involuntary commitment 
petition of patient was “miscellaneous proceeding” under 
rule exempting certain proceedings from rules of evidence, 
and thus, rules of evidence did not apply 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(A)(9) (West 2016): The 
court shall receive only reliable, competent, and material 
evidence. 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.095 (West 2016): The provisions 
of §§ 40.230 [psychotherapist-patient privilege], 40.235 
[physician-patient privilege], 40.240 [nurse-patient 
privilege] and 40.250 [regulated social worker-client 
privilege] shall not apply to and the court may consider as 
evidence any of the following . . . (B) Upon objection by 
any party to the action, the court shall exclude any part of 
the investigation report that may be excluded under the 
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Oregon Evidence Code on grounds other than those set 
forth in ORS 40.230, 40.235, 40.240 or 40.250. . . . (C) 
Neither the investigation report nor any part thereof shall 
be introduced into evidence under this paragraph unless the 
investigator is present during the proceeding to be cross-
examined or unless the presence of the investigator is 
waived by the person alleged to have a mental illness or 
counsel for the person. 
Pennsylvania Hearsay inadmissible for extended commitment hearing, In 
re Hutchinson, 421 A.2d 261 (Pa. 1980), but admissible at 
commitment hearings for less than 20 days. In re R.D., 739 
A.2d 548 (Pa. 1999) (“The legislature, for whatever reason, 
has determined that commitments for less than twenty days 
do not require the same formalities as are necessary in 
commitments for longer periods of time. Further, 
appellant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
necessarily implies that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. 50 
P.S. s 7304(e)(3).”). 
Rhode Island 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-8(i)(1)(2016): All evidence shall be 
presented according to the usual rules of evidence that 
apply in civil, non-jury cases.  
South 
Carolina 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-570 (2016): Hearing shall be 
conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent 
with orderly procedure and in a physical setting not likely to 
have a harmful effect on the mental health of the person. 
The court shall in receiving evidence follow the rules of 
evidence applicable to the probate courts of this State.  
Texas TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.031(e) (West 
2016): The Texas Rules of Evidence apply to the hearing 
unless the rules are inconsistent with this subtitle. 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A –15– 631(9)(e) (West 2016): The 
court shall consider all relevant historical and material 
information that is offered, subject to the rules of evidence, 
including reliable hearsay under Rule 1102, Utah Rules of 
Evidence.  
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 7615(c) (2016): The hearing shall be 
conducted according to the Vermont Rules of Evidence, 
and to an extent not inconsistent with this part, the 
Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable.  
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.310 (West 2016): The 
person shall be present at such proceeding, which shall in all 
respects accord with the constitutional guarantees of due 
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process of law and the rules of evidence pursuant to RCW 
71.05.360 (8) and (9). 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360(9) (West 2016): 
Privileges between patients and physicians, psychologists, or 
psychiatric advanced registered nurse practitioners are 
deemed waived in proceedings under this chapter relating 
to the administration of antipsychotic medications. As to 
other proceedings under this chapter, the privileges shall be 
waived when a court of competent jurisdiction in its 
discretion determines that such waiver is necessary to 
protect either the detained person or the public.  
West Virginia W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j) (West 2016): Conduct of hearing; 
receipt of evidence; no evidentiary privilege; record of 
hearing . . . (2): The circuit court or mental hygiene 
commissioner shall receive all relevant and material 
evidence which may be offered. (3) The circuit court or 
mental hygiene commissioner is bound by the rules of 
evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals 
except that statements made to physicians or psychologists 
by the individual may be admitted into evidence by the 
physician’s or psychologist’s testimony, notwithstanding 
failure to inform the individual that this statement may be 
used against him or her. A psychologist or physician 
testifying shall bring all records pertaining to the individual 
to the hearing. The medical evidence obtained pursuant to 
an examination under this section, or section two or three of 
this article, is not privileged information for purposes of a 
hearing pursuant to this section.  
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(10)(c) (West 2016): Except as 
otherwise provided in this chapter, the rules of evidence in 
civil actions and s. 801.01(2) apply to any judicial 
proceeding or hearing under this chapter 
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APPENDIX C: BURDEN OF PROOF 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a) (2016): clear and convincing 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2016): clear and convincing  
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540(a) (2016): clear and 
convincing 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-214(b)(2) (2016): clear and 
convincing 
California CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.6 (West 2016): probable 
cause; see also Dep’t of Corr. v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 
61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that although 
proceedings to establish involuntary conservatorship for 
person who is gravely disabled under Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act (LPS) are essentially civil in nature, grave 
disability must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to 
unanimous jury because of risk to freedom and stigma 
attached to involuntary conservatorship) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-111(1) (2016): clear and 
convincing 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-498(c) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5011(a) (2016): clear and 
convincing 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Georgia Pitts v. State, 261 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (finding 
due process requires clear and convincing standard)  
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-60.3(West 2016): clear & 
convincing for dangerousness & in need of care & no less 
restrictive alternatives but mental illness must be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt 
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 66-329(11) (2016): clear and convincing 
Indiana In re Turner, 439 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982): clear and 
convincing 
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.12(3)(c) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing  
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2969(f) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.076(2) (West 2016): manner 
of proceeding and rules of evidence shall be the same as 
those in any criminal proceeding including burden of proof 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Louisiana LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(e)(1) (2016): clear & convincing 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B § 3864(6)(A) (2016): clear & 
convincing 
Massachusetts Commonwealth v. Nassar, 406 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. 1980): 
beyond a reasonable doubt 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1465 (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(1) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (2016): clear and convincing  
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.350 (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(2) (West 2016): proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to any physical 
facts or evidence & clear & convincing evidence as to all 
other matters; respondent’s mental disorder must be proved 
to a reasonable medical certainty. 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-925(1) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433A.310(1) (West 2016): clear 
and convincing 
New 
Hampshire 
In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193 (N.H. 2006): clear and convincing 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.15 (West 2016); see also In re 
Commitment of J.R., 916 A.2d 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2007): clear and convincing 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11(C) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
New York N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Brian H., 857 N.Y.S.2d 
530 (App. Div. 2008): clear and convincing  
North 
Carolina 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268(j) (2016): clear and convincing 
evidence 
North Dakota In re B.D.K., 742 N.W.2d 41 (N.D. 2007): clear and 
convincing 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 5-415(C) (2016): clear and 
convincing 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.130 (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
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Pennsylvania 50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304(f) (West 2016): 
clear and convincing 
Rhode Island 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-8(J) (2016): clear and convincing  
South 
Carolina 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (2016): clear and convincing 
Texas TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a) (West 
2016): clear and convincing 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A –15– 631(10) (West 2016): clear 
and convincing 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7616 (2016): clear and convincing 
Virginia VA CODE ANN. § 37.2-817 (2016): clear and convincing 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 71.05.310 (West 2016): clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE, § 27-5-4(2) (West 2016): clear, cogent and 
convincing proof. 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(4)(e) (West 2016): clear and 
convincing 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110(j) (2016): clear and 
convincing 
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APPENDIX D: RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT EVALUATION 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.745(e) (2016) Upon request by an 
indigent respondent, the court shall appoint an independent 
licensed physician or other mental health professional to 
examine the respondent and testify on the respondent's 
behalf. The court shall consider an indigent respondent's 
request for a specific physician or mental health 
professional. 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-538 (2016): If unable to afford, 
court shall appoint an independent evaluator acceptable to 
patient from a list of practitioners 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-127(4)(b) (2016) The court, upon 
request of an indigent respondent or his attorney, shall 
appoint, at the court's expense, one or more professional 
persons of the respondent's selection to assist the 
respondent in the preparation of his case. 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5007(3) (2016) [right] to be 
examined by an independent psychiatrist or other qualified 
medical expert and to have such psychiatrist or other expert 
testify as a witness on the individual's behalf, such witness 
to be court appointed if the involuntary patient cannot 
afford to retain such witness. 
Florida FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)(2) (West 2016): if cannot afford, 
will be provided 
Illinois 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-804 (West 2016): if cannot 
afford one, court will arrange 
Louisiana LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:54(c)(2) (2016): Mental Health 
Advocacy Service will pay if patient cannot afford 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864 1 (2016). (D) [shall 
be notified of]  (2) The patient's right to select or to have 
the patient's attorney select an independent examiner”  
Maryland Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725 (D. Md. 1977): There 
is no constitutional right to an independent psychiatric 
examination at state expense in criminal proceedings; a 
fortiori, similar principles should control in civil 
commitment hearings involving an insanity acquittee. 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123 § 5 (2016): right to present 
independent testimony; court may provide if indigent 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1463 (West 2016): (1) If 
requested before the first scheduled hearing or at the first 
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scheduled hearing before the first witness has been sworn 
on an application or petition, the subject of a 
petition . . .  has the right at his or her own expense, or if 
indigent, at public expense , to secure an independent 
clinical evaluation by a physician, psychiatrist, or licensed 
psychologist of his or her choice relevant to whether he or 
she requires treatment, whether he or she should be 
hospitalized or receive treatment other than hospitalization, 
and whether he or she is of legal capacity. 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07 9 (West 2016): 3. Examiners. 
Prior to the hearing, the court shall inform the proposed 
patient of the right to an independent second examination. 
At the proposed patient's request, the court shall appoint a 
second examiner of the patient's choosing to be paid for by 
the county at a rate of compensation fixed by the court. 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-118 (West 2016): (1) The 
respondent, the respondent's attorney, or the friend of 
respondent appointed by the court may secure a 
professional person of the individual's own choice to 
examine the respondent and to testify at the hearing before 
the court or jury as to the results of the professional 
person's examination. (2) If the person wishing to secure 
the testimony of a professional person is unable to do so 
because of financial reasons and if the respondent joins in 
the request for the examination, the court shall appoint a 
professional person other than the professional person 
requesting the commitment to perform the examination. 
Whenever possible, the court shall allow the respondent a 
reasonable choice of an available professional person 
qualified to perform the requested examination who will be 
compensated from the public funds of the county where the 
respondent resides. 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-908 (West 2016): provided if 
indigent (limited to one evaluation) 
New Jersey In re Gannon, 301 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973): In 
proceeding for commitment to psychiatric hospital, due 
process includes right to independent psychiatric 
examination, paid for by the county, but patient does not 
get to choose the examiner, who is selected by the Court. 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11(B) (West 2016): At the hearing, 
the client shall be represented by counsel and shall have the 
right to present evidence on the client's behalf, including 
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testimony by an independent mental health professional of 
the client's own choosing 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02 (2016): provided for indigent 
patients 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (West 2016): Right to 
paid independent examiner if indigent 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.110(1) (West 2016): The judge 
shall appoint one qualified examiner. If requested, the 
judge shall appoint one additional qualified examiner. A 
request for an additional examiner under this subsection 
must be made in writing and must be made by the person 
alleged to have a mental illness or the attorney for the 
person. 
Pennsylvania Dixon v. Attorney Gen. of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. 
Pa. 1971) (“The Secretary of Public Welfare, the 
Commissioner of Mental Health, and the Attorney General 
and their representatives and successors will assure that any 
new involuntary proceedings for members of the present 
class of plaintiffs will be in accordance with the following 
principles: . . . 2) The subject thereof shall be entitled to 
independent expert examination and assistance in 
preparation for the hearing, through court appointment 
where the subject cannot afford to retain these services. 
Communications between the subject and the expert 
described herein shall be privileged.”) 
Rhode Island 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-8 (2016): expert of choice and if 
cannot afford one, court may, upon application, allow a 
reasonable fee for one 
South 
Carolina 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-530 (2016): must be given 
opportunity to request additional exam by independent 
examiner. If indigent, exam must be conducted at public 
expense. 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.14 (2016): notice of 
hearing shall include . . . (3) Notice of the person's right to 
seek an opinion of an independent psychiatrist at the 
person's own expense or at the expense of the person's 
county of residence if the person is indigent. 
Texas TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.010 (West 
2016): court may order independent evaluation chosen by 
patient if it determines evaluation will assist the fact finder 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7113 (2016): Whenever a court 
orders an independent examination by a mental health 
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professional or a qualified developmental disabilities 
professional pursuant to this title or 13 V.S.A. § 4822, the 
cost of the examination shall be paid by the Department of 
Disabilities, Aging, and Independent Living or of Health. 
The mental health professional or qualified developmental 
disabilities professional may be selected by the court but the 
Commissioner of Disabilities, Aging, and Independent 
Living or of Mental Health may adopt a reasonable fee 
schedule for examination, reports, and testimony. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7614 (2016): As soon as practicable 
after notice of the commencement of proceedings is given, 
the court on its own motion or upon the motion of the 
proposed patient or his or her attorney or the state of 
Vermont shall authorize examination of the proposed 
patient by a psychiatrist other than the physician making 
the original certification. The examination and subsequent 
report or reports shall be paid for by the state of Vermont. 
The physician shall report his or her finding to the party 
requesting the report or to the court if it requested the 
examination. 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360 (West 2016): (12) 
independent expert will be public cost if patient cannot 
afford 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4 (West 2016): (h)(3) right to 
independent expert, paid if patient indigent 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(9)(a) (West 2016): 3. If requested 
by the subject individual, the individual's attorney, or any 
other interested party with court permission, the individual 
has a right at his or her own expense or, if indigent and with 
approval of the court hearing the petition, at the reasonable 
expense of the individual's county of legal residence, to 
secure an additional medical or psychological examination 
and to offer the evaluator's personal testimony as evidence 
at the hearing. 
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APPENDIX E: GUARDIAN MENTAL HEALTH CARE DECISION 
STATUTES 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 26-2A-108 (2016): No express statutory 
language limiting or allowing mental health admissions; 
says that guardians appointed under this statute have the 
same powers, duties, and responsibilities as guardians for 
minors. Guardians for minors may consent to medical or 
other professional care or treatment of the ward. 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.316(e) (2016): A guardian may 
not: (1) place the ward in a facility or institution for the 
mentally ill other than through a formal commitment 
proceeding under AS47.30 in which the ward has a 
separate guardian ad litem 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312.01 (2016): (B) On 
clear and convincing evidence that the ward is 
incapacitated as a result of a mental disorder . . . and is 
likely to be in need of inpatient mental health care and 
treatment . . . court may authorize a guardian appointed 
pursuant to this title to give consent for the ward to 
receive inpatient mental health care. (C) The court shall 
limit the guardian’s authority to what is reasonably 
necessary to obtain the care required for the ward in the 
least restrictive treatment alternative. (D) Within 48 
hours after placement of the ward . . . the guardian shall 
give notice of this action to the ward’s attorney . . . If 
requested by the attorney, the court shall hold a hearing 
on the appropriateness of the placement within 3 days 
after receiving that request 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-303(a)(1) (2016): The 
Guardian must petition the court to get permission to 
commit the ward to a state hospital. 
California CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(a) (West 2016): No ward or 
conservatee may be placed in a mental health treatment 
facility under this division against the will of the ward or 
conservatee. [Requires compliance with the mental 
health commitment statute.] 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-316 (2016): (4) A 
guardian may not initiate the commitment of a ward to a 
mental health care institution or facility except in 
accordance with the state’s procedure for involuntary 
civil commitment. 
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Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656(d) (West 2016): 
Conservator of the person shall not have the power or 
authority to cause the respondent to be committed to 
any institution for the treatment of the mentally ill 
except under the provisions of [mental health 
commitment laws]. 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3922 (2016): (b) the guardian 
of the person has the following powers and duties: 
(1) . . . the guardian may not waive any right of the 
disabled person respecting involuntary commitment to 
any facility for the treatment of mental illness or 
deficiency. 
District of 
Columbia 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2047.01 (2016): A guardian shall 
not have the power: . . . (4) To consent to the involuntary 
or voluntary civil commitment of an incapacitated 
individual who is alleged to be mentally ill and 
dangerous under any provision or proceeding occurring 
under [D.C. statute]. 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215 (West 2016): (3) Rights that 
may be removed from a person by an order determining 
incapacity and which may be delegated to the guardian 
include the right . . . (f) To consent to medical and 
mental health treatment. . . . (4) Without first obtaining 
specific authority from the court, as described in § 
744.3725, a guardian may not: (a) Commit the ward to a 
facility, institution, or licensed service provider without 
formal placement proceeding, pursuant to chapter 393, 
chapter 394, or chapter 397. 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-23 (2016): (a) Unless inconsistent 
with the terms of any court order relating to the 
guardianship, a guardian may: . . . (2) Subject to chs. 9, 
20, and 36 of Title 31 and any other pertinent law, give 
any consents or approvals that may be necessary for 
medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment, 
or service for the ward. 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-316(d) (West 2016): A 
guardian shall not initiate the commitment of a ward to a 
mental health-care institution except in accordance with 
the State’s procedure for involuntary civil commitment. 
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-312 (2016): (1) the guardian 
has the following powers and duties: . . . (c) A guardian 
may give any consents or approvals that may be 
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necessary to enable the ward to receive medical or other 
professional care, counsel, treatment or service. . . . (e) 
Any individual who lacks capacity to make informed 
decisions about treatment upon application of the 
individual’s guardian; provided that admission to an 
inpatient facility shall require a recommendation for 
admission by a designated examiner . . .  
Illinois 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17 (West 2016): 
(a) . . . A guardian of the person may not admit a ward to 
a mental health facility except at the ward’s request as 
provided in Article IV of the Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities Code and unless the ward 
has the capacity to consent to such admission as 
provided in Article IV of the Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities Code. 
Indiana IND. CODE. ANN. § 29-3-8-2 (West 2016): (b) The 
guardian (other than a temporary guardian) of an 
incapacitated person has all of the powers to perform the 
guardian’s responsibilities, including the powers with 
respect to the incapacitated person and the incapacitated 
person’s property regardless of where the property is 
located, that are granted to the guardian of a minor 
enumerated in subsection (a)(1) through (a)(9). 
(including (a)(4), which provides: “The power to consent 
to medical or other professional care and treatment for 
the minor’s health and welfare.”) 
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.635 (West 2016): (1) Based 
upon the evidence produced at the hearing, court may 
grant a guardian the following powers and duties which 
may be exercised without prior court approval: . . . (e) 
Ensuring the ward receives professional care, counseling, 
treatment, or services as needed. If necessitated by the 
physical or mental disability of the ward, the provision of 
professional care, counseling, treatment, or services 
limited to the provision of routine physical and dental 
examinations and procedures under anesthesia is 
included, if the anesthesia is provided within the scope of 
the health care practitioner’s scope of practice 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075 (West 2016): (e) A guardian 
shall not have the power . . . (9) to place the ward in a 
treatment facility as defined in K.S.A. 59-3077, and 
amendments thereto, except if authorized by the court as 
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provided or therein [the referenced statute defines 
treatment facility as, among other things, any psychiatric 
or mental facility]. 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.660 (West 2016): Guardian 
of a disabled person shall have the following powers and 
duties, except as modified by order of the court: (1) To 
give any necessary consent or approval to enable the 
ward to receive medical or other professional care, 
counsel, treatment or service. 
Louisiana LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4566 (2016): H. Neither 
a curator nor a court shall admit or commit an interdict 
to a mental health treatment facility except in 
accordance with the provisions of R.S. 28:50 through 64. 
[mental health commitment statutes] 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-312 (2016): (a) . . . a 
guardian has the following powers and duties, except as 
modified by order of the court: (1) To the extent that it is 
consistent with the terms of any order by a court of 
competent jurisdiction relating to detention or 
commitment of the ward, he is entitled to custody of the 
person of his ward and may establish the ward’s place of 
abode within or without this State, and may place the 
ward in any hospital or other institution for care in the 
same manner as otherwise provided by law (emphasis 
added) 
Maryland MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS, § 13-708(b)(2) (West 
2016): The right to custody of the disabled person and to 
establish his place of abode within and without the State, 
provided there is court authorization for any change in 
the classification of abode, except that no one may be 
committed to a mental facility without an involuntary 
commitment proceeding as provided by law 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. ch. 190B § 5-309(f)(2016): No 
guardian shall be given the authority under this chapter 
to admit or commit an incapacitated person to a mental 
health facility or a mental retardation facility 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (West 2016): the 
guardian has all of the following powers and duties, to 
the extent granted by court order: . . . (c) The power to 
give the consent or approval that is necessary to enable 
the ward to receive medical or other professional care, 
counsel, treatment, or service. 
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Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-315(c) (West 2016): guardian 
may not initiate the commitment of ward to an 
institution except in accordance with § 524.5-313. 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-213 (2016): No express 
language limiting or allowing mental health admissions 
Missouri MO. STAT. ANN. § 475.120(5) (West 2016): No guardian 
of the person shall have authority to seek admission of 
the guardian’s ward to a mental health or mental 
retardation facility for more than thirty days for any 
purpose without court order except as otherwise 
provided by law. 
MO. STAT. ANN. § 475.121(1) (West 2016): Pursuant to 
an application alleging that the admission of the ward to 
a particular mental health or mental retardation facility 
is appropriate and in the best interest of the ward, the 
court may authorize . . . to admit the ward. Such 
application shall be accompanied by a physician’s 
statement setting forth the factual basis for the need for 
continued admission including a statement of the ward’s 
current diagnosis, plan of care, treatment or habilitation 
and the probable duration of the admission. 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-321 (West 2016): (2) [A] full 
guardian has the following powers and duties, except as 
limited by order of the court: . . . (c) A full guardian may 
give any consents or approvals that may be necessary to 
enable the ward to receive medical or other professional 
care, counsel, treatment, or service. 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.079 (West 2016): 1. . . . a 
guardian of the person . . . shall perform the duties 
necessary for the proper care, maintenance, education 
and support of the ward, including, without limitation, 
the following: . . . (c) Authorizing medical, surgical, 
dental, psychiatric, psychological, hygienic or other 
remedial care & treatment for the ward. 
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25 (2016): (I)(a) [T]he 
guardian shall be entitled to custody of the ward and 
may establish the ward’s place of abode within or 
without this state. Admission to a state institution shall 
be in accordance with the following: . . . (2) . . . without 
prior approval . . . upon written certification by a 
physician licensed in the state of New Hampshire, or, in 
the case of placement in New Hampshire hospital, by a 
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psychiatrist licensed in the state of New 
Hampshire, . . . that the placement is in the ward’s best 
interest and is the least restrictive placement available. 
Within 36 hours, excluding days when the court is closed, 
of such an admission of a ward to a state institution, the 
guardian shall submit [notice and rationale for the 
admission], together with a copy of the certificate by the 
physician or psychiatrist. 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-56 (West 2016): (d) . . . if the 
ward objects to the initiation of voluntary admission for 
psychiatric treatment or to the continuation of that 
voluntary admission, the State’s procedures for 
involuntary commitment pursuant to P.L.1987, c. 116 
shall apply. If the ward objects to any other decision of 
the guardian of the ward pursuant to this section, this 
objection shall be brought to the attention of the 
[Court], which may, in its discretion, appoint an attorney 
or guardian ad litem for the ward, hold a hearing or 
enter such orders as may be appropriate in 
circumstances. 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-6 (West 2016): C. Subject to 
the provisions of A and B of this section, a health-care 
decision made by a guardian for the protected person is 
effective without judicial approval, if the appointing 
court has expressly authorized the guardian to make 
health-care decisions for the protected person, in 
accordance with provisions of § 45-5-312 NMSA 1978, 
after notice to the protected person and any agent. 
New York N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22 (McKinney 2016): 
(b) No guardian may: 1. consent to voluntary formal or 
informal admission of incapacitated person to a mental 
hygiene facility under article 9 or 15 of this chapter 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1241 (2016): (a)(2) The guardian 
of the person may give any consent or approval that may 
be necessary to enable the ward to receive medical, legal, 
psychological, or other professional care, counsel, 
treatment, or service 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE. § 30.1-28-12 (5-312) (2016): 2. No 
guardian may voluntarily admit a ward to a mental 
health facility or state institution for a period of more 
than forty-five days without a mental health commitment 
proceeding or other court order . . . .  Notwithstanding 
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the other provisions of this subsection, the guardian may 
readmit a ward to a mental health facility or a state 
institution within sixty days of discharge from that 
institution, if the original admission to the facility or 
institution had been authorized by the court. 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.13 (West 2016): (C) A 
guardian of the person may authorize or approve the 
provision to the ward of medical, health, or other 
professional care, counsel, treatment, or services unless 
the ward or an interested party files objections with the 
probate court, or the court, by rule or order, provides 
otherwise. 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3-119 (2016): 5. No guardian 
shall have the power to consent on behalf of the ward to 
placement of the ward in a facility or institution to which 
a person without a guardian would have to be committed 
pursuant to the laws of this state absent formal 
commitment proceedings in which the ward has 
independent counsel. 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.320 (West 2016): (3) Before 
a guardian may place an adult protected person in a 
mental health treatment facility, a nursing home or other 
residential facility, guardian must file a statement with 
the court . . . guardian may thereafter place adult 
protected person in a mental health treatment facility, a 
nursing home or other residential facility without further 
court order.  If an objection is made . . . court shall 
schedule hearing on objection as soon as practicable. 
Pennsylvania 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521 (West 2016): 
(f) The court may not grant to a guardian powers 
controlled by other statute, including, but not limited to, 
power: (1) To admit incapacitated person to an inpatient 
psychiatric facility or State center for the mentally 
retarded. 
Rhode Island 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-29 (2016): No express 
language limiting or allowing mental health admissions 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-312 (2016): (3) A guardian may 
give any consents or approvals that may be necessary to 
enable the ward to receive medical or other professional 
care, counsel, treatment, or service. 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-40 (2016): A guardian of a 
protected person shall make decisions regarding the 
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protected person’s support, care, health, habilitation, 
therapeutic treatment, and, if not inconsistent with an 
order of commitment or custody, shall determine the 
protected person’s residence. 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-204 (2016): No express 
language limiting or allowing mental health admissions 
Texas TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1151.051 (West 2016): (c) A 
guardian of the person has: . . . (4) the power to consent 
to medical, psychiatric, and surgical treatment other than 
the inpatient psychiatric commitment of the ward 
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1151.053 (West 2016): (a) . . . a 
guardian may not voluntarily admit a ward to a public or 
private inpatient psychiatric facility operated by the 
Department of State Health . . . If care and treatment in 
a psychiatric or residential facility is necessary, the ward 
or the ward’s guardian may: (1) apply for services under 
Section 593.027 or 593.028, Health and Safety Code; 
(2) apply to a court to commit the person under Subtitle 
C or D, Title 7, Health and Safety Code, or Chapter 462, 
Health and Safety Code; or (3) transport the ward to an 
inpatient mental health facility for a preliminary 
examination in accordance with Subchapters A and C, 
Chapter 573, Health and Safety Code. . . . (c) A guardian 
of a person may voluntarily admit an incapacitated 
person to a residential care facility for emergency care or 
respite care under Section 593.027 or 593.028, Health 
and Safety Code 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-312 (West 2016): (b) A 
guardian may give any consents or approvals that may be 
necessary to enable the ward to receive medical or other 
professional care, counsel, treatment, or service. 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 14, § 3074 (2016): Nothing in this 
chapter shall give the guardian of a ward authority 
to: . . . (1) place that person in a state school or hospital 
except pursuant to [mental commitment procedures]; (2) 
consent to an involuntary treatment or medication 
petition pursuant to chapter 181 of Title 18. 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2019 (2016): No express language 
limiting or allowing mental health admissions 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.043 (West 2016): (4) No 
guardian, limited guardian, or standby guardian may 
involuntarily commit for mental health treatment, 
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observation, or evaluation an alleged incapacitated 
person who is unable or unwilling to give informed 
consent to such commitment unless the procedures for 
involuntary commitment . . . are followed 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1 (West 2016): (a) The 
guardian of a protected person owes a fiduciary duty to 
the protected person and is responsible for obtaining 
provision for and making decisions with respect to the 
protected person’s support, care, health, habilitation, 
education, therapeutic treatment, social interactions with 
friends and family, and, if not inconsistent with an order 
of commitment or custody, to determine the protected 
person’s residence. 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25 (West 2016): (2)(d) Guardian 
authority to exercise certain powers . . . n. The power to 
apply for protective placement under s. 55.075 or for 
commitment under s. 51.20 [involuntary commitment 
statute] or 51.45(13) for the ward; see also State ex rel. 
Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 362 N.W.2d 104 
(Wis. 1985) (holding that a guardian does not have the 
statutory authority to consent to mental hospitalization 
of his ward who is not protectively placed and who has 
not consented to such hospitalization absent compliance 
with requirements of mental health commitment statute 
(§ 51.15 and this section)). 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-202 (2016): (a) Upon order of 
the court, after notice and hearing and appointment of a 
guardian ad litem, the guardian may: (i) Commit the 
ward to a mental health hospital or other mental health 
facility 
 
